Mahama ‘resets’ income of Ghanaian cocoa famers

The cocoa sector is facing one of its gravest crises in modern history as the Mahama administration comes under intense scrutiny over accusations of broken campaign promises, policy reversals, and a dramatic collapse in farmer incomes.

What began as a political promise of prosperity for cocoa farmers during the 2024 election campaign has now evolved into a national controversy, with farmers across cocoa-growing regions accusing the government of deception after cocoa prices fell below levels recorded under the previous New Patriotic Party (NPP) administration.

During the campaign period, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) developed a strong political message centered on cocoa farmers, portraying cocoa as the backbone of rural livelihoods and promising a historic improvement in producer prices.

Senior NDC figures that’s Dr Cassiel Ato Forson now Minister for Finance and Eric Opoku, Minister for Food and Agriculture openly assured farmers that cocoa prices would be increased substantially, with campaign engagements across Ashanti, Eastern, Western, Western North, Bono, Ahafo, and Central Regions frequently referencing plans to raise the farmgate price to as high as GH¢6,000 and even beyond per bag.

These promises were framed as part of a broader rural transformation agenda, positioning the NDC as the party that would “restore dignity and prosperity” to cocoa farming communities.

However, one year into the Mahama government, the reality confronting farmers is sharply different. Instead of a historic price increase, farmers are now experiencing reduced effective earnings, with cocoa prices falling to levels significantly below the GH¢3,600 per bag previously paid under the NPP administration.

The contrast between political promises and economic outcomes has fueled widespread anger, distrust, and disillusionment across cocoa-growing areas, where livelihoods depend almost entirely on cocoa income.

The depth of the crisis became evident following an emergency Cabinet meeting held on Wednesday, February 11, 2026, convened to address the worsening cocoa sector situation.

Speaking at a press conference at Jubilee House on Thursday, the Minister for Finance, Dr. Cassiel Ato Forson, outlined the government’s position and the decisions taken by Cabinet in response to the unfolding crisis.

According to Ato Forson, the 2025/2026 cocoa season officially began in August 2025 with a producer price of GH¢51,660 per tonne.

This price was calculated as 70 percent of the Gross Free-On-Board (FOB) price of US$7,200 per tonne, using an exchange rate of GH¢10.25 to the US dollar. At the time, government officials presented the pricing structure as fair, competitive, and sustainable for farmers.

However, external regional market dynamics quickly destabilised the system. On October 1, 2025, Côte d’Ivoire — the world’s largest cocoa producer — announced a new producer price that was 20 percent higher than Ghana’s.

This development, combined with rapid exchange rate movements, created a significant price differential between Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, raising serious fears of cocoa smuggling across the western border.

To prevent the diversion of the cocoa, the Producer Price Review Committee (PPRC) intervened by adjusting Ghana’s producer price to GH¢58,000 per tonne, based on a revised exchange rate of GH¢11.5 to the US dollar. The move temporarily restored competitiveness and reduced the risk of cross-border smuggling, but it also placed additional financial pressure on COCOBOD’s already fragile finances.

From October 2025 onward, global cocoa prices began to decline sharply on the international market. Despite the falling world prices, COCOBOD continued selling cocoa until the international price dropped below US$6,400 per tonne — the estimated cost of production, logistics, and delivery from farmgate to port.

Once global prices fell below this threshold, the cocoa became structurally uncompetitive on the world market.

International buyers began to withdraw from purchasing Ghana’s cocoa, as beans from other producing countries were selling at significantly lower prices. The cocoa, priced above market levels, became commercially unattractive, leading to reduced demand, stalled contracts, and stockpiling of unsold beans.

This market crisis was compounded by COCOBOD’s inability to absorb the shock financially. The institution lacked the liquidity to continue purchasing cocoa from farmers and stockpiling for hedging or strategic trading. This weakness stemmed from a financing model introduced in the 2024/2025 season, when the traditional syndicated loan structure was disrupted and replaced with a buyer-financed purchasing model, where off-takers directly financed cocoa purchases.

This removed COCOBOD’s capacity to independently manage price volatility and market risk.

The roots of the crisis, however, stretch back several years. By 2022, COCOBOD’s finances had deteriorated significantly, leading to a default and restructuring of Cocoa Bills in 2023. That same year, Ghana experienced unprecedented delays in its annual cocoa syndication facility due to declining confidence in the national economy.

For the first time in decades, the first tranche of the syndicated loan for the 2023/2024 season was only received on December 22, 2023 — four months after the cocoa season had already begun.

The 2023/2024 season also exposed deep structural failures in production forecasting and contract management. COCOBOD projected cocoa output of 800,000 tonnes and committed 786,672 tonnes in forward contracts.

Actual production, however, reached only 432,145 tonnes — a 45 percent deviation from projections. In the global cocoa industry, normal forecast variations range between 5 and 15 percent. A 45 percent deviation was unprecedented and catastrophic.

This collapse forced Ghana into rollover contracts of 333,767 tonnes at an average price of just US$2,661 per tonne, locking the country into selling cocoa far below market value. The resulting financial loss was estimated at over US$1 billion — revenue that would otherwise have flowed into the cocoa value chain, benefiting farmers, Licensed Buying Companies, COCOBOD, and the national economy.

By July 2024, COCOBOD was unable to pay the final tranche of the syndicated loan and required a US$70 million bridge financing facility from the Ministry of Finance to avert a formal default. Despite commitments to repay the facility, COCOBOD defaulted on the bridge financing, deepening its financial crisis. These liabilities were inherited by the current management.

Empty Promise

Against this historical background, critics argue that the NDC’s campaign promises to drastically increase cocoa prices were made without regard to the fragile financial condition of COCOBOD, global market volatility, and structural weaknesses in the cocoa financing system.

Instead of the promised prosperity, farmers are now facing reduced prices, delayed payments, restricted purchasing, and in some cases, an inability to sell their cocoa at all.

Across cocoa-growing communities, the social consequences are severe.

Farmers report inability to pay farm labourers, purchase inputs, maintain plantations, pay school fees, or support their families. Entire local economies built around cocoa are experiencing contraction, with ripple effects on transport operators, traders, artisans, and small businesses.

What was presented during the campaign as a future of abundance has now become a symbol of broken trust. For many farmers, the issue is no longer about economic explanations or policy technicalities — it is about political honesty, credibility, and survival.